



Australian  
National  
University



## FORGOTTEN FRIENDS

### Australia, India and the independence of Bangladesh

Richard C Smith

National Security College Working Paper No 4, May 2016

National Security  
College

Crawford School of  
Public Policy

ANU College of  
Asia & the Pacific

## About the National Security College

The National Security College is a joint initiative of the Australian Government and The Australian National University. It is a specialist graduate centre for national security study, research and policy engagement. We offer executive and professional development courses as well as graduate and doctoral studies that address security challenges facing Australia, the Indo-Pacific region and the world.

## About the author



Mr Richard C. Smith AO PSM was educated at the University of Western Australia and was a high school teacher for three years before joining the Department of External Affairs in 1969. He served in Australia's missions in New Delhi, Tel Aviv, Manila

and Honolulu, as Deputy Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 1992 to 1994, and as Deputy Secretary in the Department of Defence in 1994-1995.

Mr Smith served as Ambassador to China from 1996 to 2000, as Ambassador to Indonesia in 2001-2002, and as Secretary of the Department of Defence from 2002 until his retirement in 2006. In 2008, Mr Smith led a review of Australia's homeland and border security arrangements. From 2009 to 2013 he served as Australia's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2011-12 he co-led a review of 'Australia's Defence Force Posture'.

Mr Smith is: Chair of the Defence Council-Victoria; Chair of the RAND Australia Advisory Board; Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy; and Adjunct Professor at Griffith University. He was at the S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies in Singapore in 2007 and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington DC in 2009.

## National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

<b>Authors</b>	Smith, Richard C
<b>Title</b>	Forgotten friends: Australia, India & the independence of Bangladesh
<b>ISSN</b>	2203 - 4943 (National Security College Working Paper Series)
<b>ISBN</b>	978-1-925084-16-0
<b>Series</b>	National Security College occasional paper: 3
<b>Notes</b>	Includes bibliographical references.
<b>Subjects</b>	National security--Australia. National security--Australia--21st century. Military planning--Australia. Political leadership--Australia--21st century. Australia--Politics and government--21st century.
<b>Other Authors/ Contributors</b>	Australian National University. National Security College.
<b>Dewey Number</b>	355.0330994
<b>Published and distributed by</b>	National Security College Level 3, Building 132a 1 Lennox Crossing Australian National University Acton ACT 2601 T: (02) 6125 1219 E: <a href="mailto:national.security.college@anu.edu.au">national.security.college@anu.edu.au</a> W: <a href="http://nsc.anu.edu.au">http://nsc.anu.edu.au</a>

## About the Working Paper Series

The National Security College 'Working Paper Series' provides access to fully-referenced journal length articles in draft format. The series provides an opportunity for policy makers, scholars and members of the public to have unrestricted web-based access to these works and to provide constructive feedback for the purpose of improving the article before it is submitted and published in either a journal or an edited book. If you have any comments, please send them to the author of this paper at [EA.Head.NSC@anu.edu.au](mailto:EA.Head.NSC@anu.edu.au)

## About this publication

This National Security College Working Paper is an extract from a planned forthcoming publication from the Australian Institute of International Affairs. This publication will reflect in-depth on the conflict that led to the independence of Bangladesh, as well as the role of Australian diplomacy in the context of relations with India and the United States.

# FORGOTTEN FRIENDS: AUSTRALIA, INDIA & THE INDEPENDENCE OF BANGLADESH

Outside the sub-continent, the bloodshed in South Asia 45 years ago has been too easily forgotten. In 2016, as the number of people displaced by the ongoing tragedy in Syria and Iraq passed the ten million mark after several years of civil war, who remembered that the same number of Bengalis fled from East Pakistan in the space of just seven months in 1971? Beyond that it deserves to be remembered because of the repression and bloodshed that included the deaths of an estimated 300,000 people.<sup>1</sup>

Yet the events themselves are only part of the story. In all this, there is also an important story to tell about Australian policy in response to the crisis, authentic in nature and origin, and different from that of the United States – but neither well-remembered, nor fully explained. It is this last story – the Australian dimension – that this article has as its main focus.

Indeed, from an early stage the Australian Government showed a realistic appreciation of the situation in the sub-continent as it unfolded in late 1970 and early 1971. An assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in early March 1971 concluded that the division of Pakistan into two states was “nigh inevitable”, though the prospects for an independent Bangladesh were not considered bright. The paper

also noted the challenges that the emergence of a new, impoverished nation of 70 million people in South East Asia would pose for Australia, as well as for Japan, the wealthiest countries in the region.<sup>2</sup>

By way of illustration, in April 1971 Prime Minister William McMahon wrote to President Yahya Khan, urging him to consider releasing the Awami League leaders as a step toward a political solution. McMahon also wrote to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi assuring her that he was seized of the gravity of the refugee problem, and making the point that “the transfer of power to elected representatives of the people offers the best hope of progress towards a solution.”<sup>3</sup>

Siddhartha Shankar Ray, a senior Cabinet Minister close to the Prime Minister and himself a West Bengali, visited Australia in June to explain India’s position. He made a good impression, and helped consolidate the case for more humanitarian aid. Upon returning to New Delhi, he noted the Australian community’s understanding for India’s position. Foreign Minister Leslie Bury remarked to him that “You are in a hell of a jam”. For the beleaguered Indian government, this was taken, rightly, to reflect a degree of sympathy.<sup>4</sup>



Dhaka, 19 December 1971: Indian troops arrive, in the closing phase of the conflict that led to the independence of Bangladesh. (Image: Popperfoto, ©GettyImages)

## The role of the diplomats

Australia's high commissioners in New Delhi and Islamabad were, respectively, Patrick Shaw and Francis Stuart. From the outset, Shaw emphasised India's concerns about the refugee inflow and the political and economic challenges it engendered. Drawing on his access to Indian ministers and officials, he also reported on the Indian government's disappointment with UN and Non-Aligned Movement responses to the crisis, and on India's concerns about American policies.

Shaw advocated busily for Australian aid to help India cope with the refugees. An amount of \$500,000 was announced on 27 May 1971, followed by another \$500,000 on 8 June. Following a visit to refugee camps in West Bengal in July, Shaw reported that the Australian assistance to date had amounted to less than two per cent of all international aid. He urged another aid tranche, which was forthcoming. Shaw commented: "Australia's timely refugee assistance has been greatly appreciated... Apart from its humanitarian aspect... our contribution has had favourable impact on Indo-Australian relations generally, out of all proportion to its magnitude." He noted that the fact supplies had been delivered directly by RAAF aircraft had added much to the Indian government's appreciation of Australian aid.<sup>5</sup>

From Islamabad, Francis Stuart shared the department's judgement about the likely demise of Pakistan and the poor prospects for an independent state in East Pakistan. On 8 April, he reported that "the evidence of the last month has confirmed (Canberra's) view that the present state of Pakistan will split into two... the Army will almost certainly be forced to withdraw itself from the East Wing..."<sup>6</sup> This was a sound judgement, but different at that time from the view held in Washington, at least in the White House.

Stuart's gloom about the viability of a successor state remained a theme in his reporting. He reported on 15 July that "I see diminished prospects of East Bengal being able to rule itself under any arrangements", a view which was apparently consistent with the assessment of Australian intelligence agencies.<sup>7</sup>

Shaw and Stuart met to exchange views on three occasions during the crisis. After their second meeting in Islamabad on 22 July, they reported that "It is our judgement that the Pakistan Government will be unlikely to maintain its control over East

Pakistan for very long ... In the long term, the Pakistan Government will have to abandon East Pakistan, and perhaps to its advantage".<sup>8</sup>

But as the year of 1971 progressed, Shaw and Stuart developed different perspectives on some key issues. The events of July and August – Kissinger's visit to China and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 9 August – took Australia's diplomatic missions by surprise. In New Delhi, the High Commission had been aware that an agreement of some sort had been under discussion with Moscow. But they did not know that the negotiations had come to embrace a mutual security component. Nor was the high commission aware of the conversation between India's Ambassador in Washington, LK Jha, and Dr Kissinger on 17 July, in which Kissinger, seemingly contradicting earlier advice, had said that if China became involved in a conflict between India and Pakistan, India could not expect support from the United States.

Shaw and Stuart disagreed on the Treaty's impact. Shaw contended that the "effect of the Treaty had been to reduce the possibility of war". But Stuart felt that with India's confidence now restored, it was *more* likely. In the end this difference was essentially one about the timing of any conflict. As Shaw put it, Mrs Gandhi has been able to "buy time in which to consider what she can do to relieve the financial burden on India and the political pressure on herself".<sup>9</sup>

Most fundamentally, Shaw and Stuart also differed over India's motives and ambitions. Stuart considered that India was pursuing a long-held strategic ambition to dismember Pakistan, weakening it as a state and placing India in a situation of supremacy in the sub-continent. He felt strongly that it was all part of India's aspiration for great power status.

From New Delhi, Shaw was aware of India's growing support for the Mukti Bahini and its cross-border operations. But he nevertheless rejected the notion that India's ambitions went beyond resolving the situation in the east to allow the return of the refugees. He reported no evidence within the government of any more ambitious agenda. He was aware of what Indian 'hawks' were saying, but did not consider these views to represent mainstream Indian opinion, and took at face value the assurances of Indian government spokesmen about India's limited objectives. Shaw's opinion was supported by, among others, James Plimsoll, who had been

Australia's High Commissioner in India from 1962 to 1965, Secretary of DEA from 1965 to 1970, and, in 1971, was Ambassador to the United States.

Prime Ministers McMahon and Gandhi met in Washington on 4 November 1971 while on respective official visits. McMahon told Mrs Gandhi he was concerned that the United States did not understand what was happening, and that the administration did not appreciate that the basic problem was within East Bengal, not between India and Pakistan. He told her he would write to Yahya again, expecting, he said, that his "message might have added weight coming from Washington".<sup>10</sup> In the letter – his fourth<sup>11</sup> – McMahon again urged a "political settlement based upon negotiation with the Awami League and its leaders, particularly Sheikh Mujibur Rahman."<sup>12</sup> In this, he was reflecting advice from Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen and his department, and from Jim Allen in Dhaka, which consistently emphasised that the "release of Mujib" was the key to resolving the crisis.



Australian emergency aid arrives in India for refugees from the then East Pakistan in 1971. NAA: A1200, L96873.

## Australia responds to the crisis

Following the declaration of war on 4 December, Foreign Minister Bowen said in a formal statement that Australia "deeply regrets that events in the Indian subcontinent have led to full-scale warfare between India and Pakistan." Australia, he said:

regretted that its repeated efforts to try to influence the leaders of Pakistan and India in the direction of reaching a political settlement ... have been unsuccessful ... Our view is that the first requirement is an agreed ceasefire with a disengagement and withdrawal of opposing forces. This must be accompanied by a political settlement directed towards removing the underlying causes of conflict. Meanwhile, Australia's position, as a friend of both Pakistan and India, will continue to be that of a neutral.<sup>13</sup>

Shaw was unconcerned by Pakistani threats to slice through to New Delhi with an armoured Blitzkrieg. He was confident that India's war aims were limited and that the war would be over within in two weeks. Once again, he disagreed with Stuart, who contended on 6 December that "Pakistan has been the victim of calculated and graduated aggression...". India, Stuart argued, would probably ensure the "complete annihilation ...of the Pakistan Army (in Bangladesh)" and "then turn its forces to the West and seek to destroy Pakistan's Western Army".<sup>14</sup> This judgement was again in tune with that of the White House.

Australia was not a member of the UN Security Council at the time and did not take a position on the December resolutions. When the matter was referred to the General Assembly on 8 December, Australia supported a resolution calling for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 104 to 11, with ten (including the UK and France) abstaining. In response to Indian expressions of regret about Australia's vote, which were seen to be inconsistent with its earlier positions, it was explained simply that it was impossible to avoid supporting calls for a ceasefire in a war.

The government addressed the question of recognition soon after Mujib returned to Dhaka.<sup>15</sup> DFA Secretary Sir Keith Waller told First Assistant Secretary David Anderson on 11 January that he thought Australia should recognise Bangladesh "fairly soon" and was prepared to take a "bit of a risk" on it. He said he had already had some pressure on

the matter from Prime Minister McMahon, though the Minister (Bowen) was not attracted to the idea of precipitate recognition.<sup>16</sup>

On 14 January, McMahon told Waller he was not unduly perturbed by the possibility that Pakistan might cut off diplomatic relations if Australia recognised Bangladesh. “We have done a lot already. These people will be important to us in the future”, he said.<sup>17</sup> Nor was he concerned by advice from the British that Kissinger had warned their Ambassador in Washington that it would be “premature” to recognise Bangladesh before the President’s visit to Beijing (scheduled for May), and would be “taken amiss.”<sup>18</sup>

In the event, Australia announced its recognition of Bangladesh on 31 January 1972. It was delayed by the desire to move in company with ‘like-minded’. The United Kingdom and others were canvassed but they all delayed. So Australia moved with only New Zealand and Fiji to become the ninth (and first non-eastern bloc) government to recognise the new state.



Refugees from the then East Pakistan arrive at Tripura in India’s northeast, during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. (Image: Dinodia Photos, ©GettyImages)

## Australian policy: a retrospective view, & Australia-US divergence

While Canberra’s policy responses in the early days of the crisis seemed spontaneous, by year’s end they had become quite deliberate. Australia’s position was also distinctive among usually ‘like-minded’ governments. Early in the crisis, in light of the tone and content of McMahon’s correspondence, a British official had remarked that the Australian position “went rather further than anything we had said to the Pakistanis”.<sup>19</sup> By comparison, Raghavan notes the more cautious approaches of the UK and Canada, each of whom was reluctant to come out against Pakistan and risk the leverage they believed they had in Islamabad.

In short, two strands of Australian policy emerged quite early: acceptance of the reality that East Pakistan was finished; and well-founded humanitarian concern. Although there were occasional criticisms of India, and some officials stressed the need to ‘balance’ the relationship between the two countries, Australia’s position was more sympathetic to India than most other Western governments. Future High Commissioners would note this position was remembered and respected in New Delhi over the following decades.

As the crisis unfolded, the nature of Australia’s policy interests broadened. Concern about India’s potential isolation and the determination to recognise Bangladesh early reflected a mature sense of the sort of role Bowen saw for Australia in the world. This was evident when he told Parliament in May 1972 that “Australia took not simply an active interest but a positive role, in some respects a leading role.”<sup>20</sup>

Australia’s policy responses throughout the crisis were also different from those of the United States. This was acknowledged explicitly by Bowen when he said, in a letter to US Secretary of State Rogers, on 22 December: “I have noticed that during the past few weeks differences have developed between American and Australian policies in relation to the

present crisis on the Indian sub-continent.” In strong language that captured Australian policy thinking rather better than those used in DFA’s cable to Shaw and Stuart, the letter went on:

I know you feel that attempts being made by the United States to produce a political settlement were wrecked by India... it cannot be overlooked that the Government of Pakistan by its repressive actions in East Pakistan caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and the flight into India of about 10 million more. Pakistan’s military regime by many acts of brutality created a situation which was intolerable for its own people. It was Pakistan that mounted the pre-emptive air attack on India.<sup>21</sup>

Plimsoll took the letter to Rogers, who pointed out that the United States, as a matter of principle, was opposed to breaking up states. Plimsoll responded that sometimes states do nevertheless break up, and in this case “the people had broken away and this had to be recognised”.<sup>22</sup> Again, Rogers did not allude to the global or geopolitical context in which Kissinger had come to see the crisis. Later, in his embassy’s *Annual Review* for 1971-72, Plimsoll reported that the East Pakistan issue was “the only issue on which Australian and US policies have diverged markedly.”<sup>23</sup>

Three questions arise. Did the United States care about these differences between its positions and those of its ally? Did Australia influence the United States in any way, or attempt to? And why were the positions of these two allies so different?

On the first US question, the differences would have been noted within the State Department, and mentioned in the briefing prepared for Nixon’s meeting with McMahon on 4 December. But overall, Canberra’s position did not matter much to the Nixon Administration. Indeed, Kissinger notes in his memoir that “... the President would be reluctant to confront Yahya, but ... the White House would not object to other countries’ efforts to dissuade him from using force”.<sup>24</sup>

As to whether Canberra sought to influence Washington, it is easy to think that any advocacy would have been ineffectual since the attitudes of the president and his National Security Adviser were firmly entrenched. Plimsoll did however try. As Jeremy Horder records, Plimsoll in 1981 had said he saw Secretary of State Rogers and other officials “to try to hold them back from any violent support for Pakistan”, though he was unsure his message was getting through to the White House. Plimsoll may have been referring here to an occasion on which he had received a personal message from Mrs Gandhi asking him to intercede with Kissinger, to try to persuade him to a more balanced view of India’s position.<sup>25</sup>

Yet Horder also reveals some evidence that Plimsoll’s modesty might have been misplaced. He notes that at a function at the White House in 1973 the president had said to another guest that Plimsoll had been “... of great value to us in recent troubles in India and Bangladesh.” And Nixon told Plimsoll on another occasion “I will never forget what you did for us on Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. I will always be grateful. We owe you a great deal.”

In recording this later, Plimsoll said he was unsure what the president was referring to, but he speculated that the United States may have been contemplating some sort of military intervention in support of Pakistan and that “what I had been saying to people may have held them back.”<sup>26</sup>

## Why the difference?

The remaining question is this: why were the Australian and US positions so different on an issue where they might logically have had shared interests? The question is especially pertinent given that this was a conservative (Liberal/Country Party-coalition) successor to the one that had famously said Australia was “all the way with LBJ”. It is more intriguing because Australia was still engaged in Vietnam alongside the United States. There are three plausible explanations.

### 1. Unaligned interests

The first and most evident explanation is that the two countries' interests were not the same. American interests were shaped initially by the impending rapprochement with China and Kissinger's planned visit to Beijing – of which the Australian government knew nothing. Later, as the crisis reached its denouement, the eyes of Nixon and Kissinger were on the geopolitical stakes. The Australian Government did not see things or operate at that level – and may not have agreed that so much was at stake.

In short, Australia's view of the issues was simpler and less cluttered than the United States' – probably more akin to what Kissinger had identified as the regional view taken by the State Department. As a result it was easier for Australia to base its positions on judgements about the moral issues and South Asian realpolitik than to take contrary positions.

### 2. Impact of the diplomatic voice

Yet there seems to have been more to it than this. Australian policy in regard to the sub-continent since 1947 had been to try to maintain a 'balance' between India and Pakistan – to treat each the same. This 'hyphenation' had had its origins in the need to ensure neutrality on the Kashmir dispute, but it had come to pervade all areas of Australian interest. While at the highest levels there was more sympathy for India, within DFA at least the inclination was still to apply the template with little consideration of the merits of the issues.

The post-war cable of 20 December in which Bowen had sought the views of Shaw and Stuart suggests that the 'delicate balance' approach persisted at the levels at which the cable was drafted. Taking care to distribute blame evenly, it noted that “Both sides have made serious mistakes. Pakistan by

its brutal military regime in the East... and the pre-emptive strike on 3rd December... (while) India by its flagrant support for the Mukti Bahini contravened UN Resolutions she herself had helped to draft, and seriously jeopardised international attempts to produce a reasonable political settlement”.

At this level then, the commitment to 'balance' seems to have been firmly embedded. But more senior officials, including at the 'permanent head level', had been thinking more broadly about Australia's interests in the sub-continent. Keith Waller said that in coming to the office of Secretary of DFA in 1970, one of his three main objectives had been to “change the emphasis in our attitude to India and Pakistan”, where in his view Australia had been “quite unrealistic” in favouring Pakistan over India.<sup>27</sup>

Arthur Tange, one of Waller's predecessors in DFA, who was by now secretary of the defence department and had served as High Commissioner in New Delhi, had told Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck in 1966 that the 'delicate balance' approach had had a “stifling effect on the development of policies to further our interests”. Tange criticised what he called “the over-simplified concept of parity... the two countries are not equal.”<sup>28 29</sup> Plimsoll, Waller's predecessor and now ambassador in Washington, held very similar views.<sup>30</sup> And Shaw became a vocal and respected advocate from New Delhi of the need to deal with the issue on its merits.<sup>31</sup>

### 3. The Prime Minister's call?

There may also have been a third factor shaping Australia's policies. Customarily in Australia the Prime Minister of the day 'owns' the relationship with the United States, and that was the case for McMahon's three Liberal Party predecessors.<sup>32</sup> Yet it might have been expected that he would have been sensitive to Washington's positions, and concerned not to let Australian policy stray too far from them.

But McMahon himself was quite active on the issue. McMahon was not reputed as a strategic thinker, but he was shrewd, media-sensitive and not inclined to let loyalty get in the way of his own interests. He may well have considered that after Nixon had embarrassed him by suddenly engaging China, there was nothing owing to the White House. He may have judged too that with an election due in 1972,

and Vietnam looming as a toxic issue, it made sense to maintain some distance from Washington on an issue on which closeness was not essential.

McMahon was also under pressure from Gough Whitlam's Labor Opposition, which was articulating the need for a more 'independent' foreign policy. Before his visit to Washington in November 1971, McMahon was reported to be "at pains to stress that he would not relegate Australia to the status of 'echo or satellite' of the United States"<sup>33</sup>, and it is possible that the East Pakistan crisis offered an opportunity to give some substance to this position. Following McMahon's visit and his subsequent meeting with Mrs Gandhi, one of the travelling press party, John Stubbs, wrote:

Mrs Indira Gandhi found a new and active ally in Washington last week. Not President Nixon, who made no concessions to her case against Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister's ally is Mr McMahon, who is expected to argue in (his forthcoming visit to) London that international pressure should be applied to Pakistan. (Mr McMahon) appears to have taken a calculated position that runs counter to his Government's strongly maintained policy of non-interference in the politics of other countries... On most topics he seems determined to adopt new and more independent approach than Australian Prime Ministers (visiting London) have done in the past.<sup>34</sup>

The superficial nature of McMahon's posturing was evident in the fact that he used his visits to Washington and London to seek closer engagement with both governments, especially in response to the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. And the day after Australia announced its recognition of Bangladesh, McMahon wrote to Yahya Khan again, saying that "Our recognition in no way detracts from the importance we attach to our friendship with Pakistan," and expressing the "hope that good relations would continue."<sup>35</sup> But it suited McMahon for Australia to take positions on the India- Pakistan issue that differed from those of the United States.

## Forty years on

As Australia's 'mandarins' had foreseen, India was always likely to be a more significant player in world affairs than Pakistan. In the short-term, though, while Australia's sympathetic position was well remembered in New Delhi for some time, the Australia-India relationship benefited little from the new promise it had briefly shown in 1971-72.

It was not until after the Cold War had ended and a process of economic reform began that India was able to begin to translate its importance onto a wider international canvass. Forty years after the 1971 crisis, with India having been through another round of nuclear tests, with the rise of China suggesting a new 'balancing' role for India, and with economic reforms beginning to show real returns, the Australia-India relationship began to realise the potential that wiser heads had seen in 1971.



Australia was quick to recognise the new state of Bangladesh. The first Bangladeshi High Commissioner to Australia, Mr Hossain Ali, presents his credentials to the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, in 1972. NAA: A6180, 12/5/72/90.

## Endnotes

1. The matter of how many people were killed has been contentious. A post-war Pakistan government enquiry put the figure at 26,000; the Bangladesh government claimed it was three million. Sisson and Rose estimated the number to be 300,000. A 2008 British Medical Journal study adduced a figure of 269,000. As to the number of refugees who crossed into India, the figures cited by Indian authorities (and used in this essay) are generally considered to be accurate because of the Indian bureaucracy's painstaking way of recording them. They were generally not questioned by UNHCR or aid agencies. See Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990); Ziad Obermeyer, Christopher J. L. Murray and Emmanuela Gakidou, "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme", *BMJ vol. 336* (2008): pp. 1482-1486.
2. Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press Cambridge, 2013), p. 170, citing Policy Planning Paper of 9/3/71 held in National Archives of Australia (NAA).
3. McMahon to Gandhi, 3 June 1971, *India - Relations with Australia*, NAA: A1838, 169/10/1 PART 18, National Archives of Australia, Canberra.
4. Raghavan, *1971*, p. 171, quoting Indian archival sources.
5. Shaw to Minister, 6 August 1971, *North Asia, South Asia, South East Asia despatches 1971*, NAA: A4231, 1971/Asia Despatches, National Archives of Australia, Canberra.
6. Stuart to DFA, 8 April 1971, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 1, National Archives of Australia, Canberra.
7. Quoted by Shaw, 6 August 1971, *North Asia, South Asia, South East Asia despatches 1971*, NAA: A4231, 1971/Asia Despatches.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. McMahon to Gandhi, 6 November 1971, *India - Relations with Australia*, NAA: A1838, 169/10/1 PART 19.
11. The official record indicates four, but McMahon told Gandhi it would be his fifth.
12. McMahon to Yahya Khan, 4 November 1971, *India - Relations with Australia*, NAA: A1838, 169/10/1 PART 19.
13. Press Statement by Foreign Minister Bowen, 7 December 1971, in *Current notes on international affairs Vol. 42*, (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1971), p. 629.
14. Stuart to DFA, 6 December 1971, *India - Relations with Australia*, NAA: A1838, 169/10/1 PART 20.
15. Don Hook recalls that Jim Allen was among the first people Mujib greeted on his arrival back in Dhaka airport – embracing him warmly and thanking him.
16. Waller to Anderson, 11 January 1972, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 2, National Archives of Australia, Canberra; Waller, record of a telephone conversation with McMahon, 14 January 1972, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 2.
17. Waller, record of a telephone conversation with McMahon, 14 January 1972, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 2.
18. AHC London to DFA, 10 January 1972, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 2.
19. Raghavan, *1971*, p. 171.
20. Nigel Bowen, Ministerial statement of Australian Foreign Policy, in *Hansard*, 9 May 1972, House of Representatives, p. 2218.
21. Bowen to Rogers, 22 December 1971, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 1.
22. Plimsoll to DFA, 22 December 1971, *Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*, NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 1.

23. Jeremy Hearder, *Jim Plim: Ambassador Extraordinary* (Ballarat: Connor Court, 2015), p. 235.
24. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 852.
25. Hearder, *Jim Plim*, p. 235.
26. Ibid.
27. Keith Waller, *A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories* (Nathan: Griffith University, 1990), p. 45.
28. Meg Gurry, *Australia and India: Mapping the Journey 1944-2014* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2015), pp. 90-91.
29. With considerable prescience, Tange's parting advice to his successor as High Commissioner, Patrick Shaw, in 1970 had been not "to echo the American point of view ... [it] destroys respect for Australia as an independent nation". See Gurry, *Australia and India*, p. 77.
30. See Hearder, *Jim Plim*, p. 234; Gurry, *Australia and India*, p. 88.
31. This was also the view of most of those who served as Australian High Commissioner in New Delhi, including Peter Heydon, who became Secretary of the Immigration Department, but died in May 1971, as the crisis was playing out.
32. Indeed, when John Gorton became Prime Minister following Harold Holt's disappearance, Waller, then Ambassador in Washington, asked his Minister Paul Hasluck whether he should step aside to allow Gorton to appoint his own person to the job. See Geoffrey Bolton, *Paul Hasluck: A Life* (Crawley: UWA Publishing, 2014).
33. *Melbourne Herald*, 4 November 1971, quoted in James Curran, *Holy Fury* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015), p. 109.
34. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 November 1971, by-line John Stubbs.
35. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 February 1972.

## Bibliography

### Archival sources

*India - Relations with Australia*. NAA: A1838, 169/10/1 PART 18-20. National Archives of Australia, Canberra.

*North Asia, South Asia, South East Asia despatches 1971*. NAA: A4231, 1971/Asia Despatches. National Archives of Australia, Canberra.

*Bangladesh - Relations with Australia - Political - General*. NAA: A1838, 144/10/1 PART 1-2. National Archives of Australia, Canberra.

*Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 November 1971.

*Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 February 1972.

### Publications

Bolton, Geoffrey. *Paul Hasluck: A Life*. Crawley: UWA Publishing, 2014.

Bowen, Nigel. Ministerial statement of Australian Foreign Policy. *Hansard*, 9 May 1972. House of Representatives: pp. 2189-2275.

Bowen, Nigel. Press Statement by Foreign Minister Bowen, 7 December 1971. *Current notes on international affairs Vol. 42*. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1971.

Curran, James. *Holy Fury*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015.

Gurry, Meg. *Australia and India: Mapping the Journey 1944-2014*. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2015.

Hearder, Jeremy. *Jim Plim: Ambassador Extraordinary*. Ballarat: Connor Court, 2015.

Kissinger, Henry. *White House Years*. Boston: Little Brown, 1979.

Obermeyer, Ziad, Christopher J. L. Murray and Emmanuela Gakidou. "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programme". *BMJ vol. 336* (2008): pp. 1482-1486.

Raghavan, Srinath. *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press Cambridge, 2013.

Sisson, Richard and Leo E. Rose. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.

Waller, Keith. *A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories*. Nathan: Griffith University, 1990.

# CONTACT US

## **National Security College**

Crawford Bldg #132a

1 Lennox Crossing

The Australian National University

Acton ACT 2601

Australia

T +61 2 6125 1219

E [national.security.college@anu.edu.au](mailto:national.security.college@anu.edu.au)

W [nsc.anu.edu.au](http://nsc.anu.edu.au)

CRICOS Provider #00120C